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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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AMERICA'S SILVER BULLETS: ALLOCATING
LOW DENSITY HIGH DEMAND ASSETS

By


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or Department of the Navy.

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16 May 1999



Captain D.K.N. Grant, U.S. Navy

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Abstract of

AMERICA'S SILVER BULLETS: ALLOCATING LOW DENSITY HIGH DEMAND ASSETS

Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) was established in 1996 to protect against excessive OPTEMPO and ensure readiness of assets with unique mission capabilities but which are limited in number. Deployment of these Low Density High Demand assets receives Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense scrutiny under GMFP. Unfortunately, administration, execution, and prioritization challenges have reduced the effectiveness of GMFP. In the three years since GMFP was established, there have been numerous instances where steady-state OPTEMPO has been exceeded during peacetime, resulting in lost training opportunities, degraded readiness, reduced material condition, shortened service life and deteriorated morale.

The objective of GMFP is to ensure LDHD assets are available for warfighting CINCs when required for major crisis. Failure to accept some level of risk today by rejecting a CINC request for an LDHD asset effectively transfers that risk down the road to when the asset might not be available in time of crisis. The Joint Staff must tighten the reins on the LDHD assets through disciplined and consistent responses to allocation requests. Eliminate applicability limitations to make all Service and Reserve Component Low Density High Demand assets available for GMFP allocation. Finally, improve Service and CINC information input to GMFP, and connectivity to make execution of GMFP more effective.

GLOBAL MILITARY FORCE POLICY ROLES AND GOALS

Military Services maintain readiness to the best of their abilities following post-Cold War downsizing. Warfighting Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) vie for limited assets in their attempt to support a strategy of engagement. The Joint Staff's struggle to meet CINC requirements with reduced overall force strength is the challenge at hand.

Peacetime operations tempo (OPTEMPO) is a major concern for senior military leaders. Over the past decade, overall force structure has declined by one third. At the same time, deployment requirements across a broad range of military operations have greatly increased.¹ General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), acknowledged these trends in his posture statement for a congressional committee delivered in early 1998.²

"The reality of our current tempo is that we are doing more operations with a smaller force. On any given day more than 40,000 personnel are participating in ongoing named operations and many more are away from home supporting other routine, yet no-less demanding, requirements. Unchecked, high tempo may lead to both near-term and long-term readiness concerns. In the near-term, increased tempo contributes to lost training opportunities and accelerated wear on equipment. In the long-term, increased tempo has its greatest impact on our people, by negatively impacting their quality of life and jeopardizing our ability to attract and retain quality people."

This increased OPTEMPO has the potential to degrade overall military readiness and asset service life. In 1996, The Department of Defense recognized OPTEMPO was becoming excessive for certain assets with unique mission capabilities but which were available in limited numbers. CINCs have ongoing requirements for these "low density" assets. The "high demand" to cover theater specific operations had become a near-term crisis with respect to readiness, lost training, deferred maintenance and quality of life.³

In response to CJCS tasking, the Services nominated specific military assets to determine which were most negatively affected by the OPTEMPO trends and designated them low density/high demand (LDHD). The list includes assets from all branches of the

military, with most assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the U. S. Air Force.⁴ Among them are reconnaissance/battlefield management assets, electronic warfare aircraft, special operations force assets, Patriot missile battalions and others. A complete list of designated LDHD assets is included as Appendix A.

CJCS was also tasked to provide closer management of OPTEMPO for the LDHD assets. The Joint Staff responded by developing Global Military Force Policy (GMFP). GMFP was established to provide peacetime prioritization guidelines for allocating LDHD assets. The goal of GMFP is to ensure the LDHD assets are kept at the highest possible level of readiness to respond to crises when needed, while meeting CINC peacetime requirements. GMFP provides tools to allocate LDHD assets for crises, contingencies and long-term joint task force operations.⁵ Under GMFP, the Secretary of Defense allocates LDHD assets after receiving advice from CJCS.

The CINCs play two roles in the GMFP process. Commanders in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) have combatant command for LDHD assets, and act as asset providers to the geographic CINCs. Therefore ACOM and PACOM assume the role of supplier. EUCOM, PACOM and CENTCOM are the predominant requestors of LDHD asset allocations. They are the customers. PACOM is uniquely dual-hatted.

GMFP provides several options for dealing with CINC allocation requests. Alternatives such as tethers, prepare to deploy orders (PTDOs) and substitutes provide options that do not increase OPTEMPO, which the Joint Staff may consider when responding to a CINC request for an LDHD asset allocation.⁶ Tethers are analogous to shared-use in that the asset may be deployed to one area of responsibility while tethered, or responsive, to

another. The tethered LDHD asset will have an associated response time to get to the crisis. Because tethers are established for deployed LDHD assets, they maintain the highest level of readiness. PTDOs represent the next highest level of readiness and allow the asset to remain at home base. PTDO status incurs training requirements and limitations to ensure an adequate response time in case the deployment order is given. An asset operating from its home base, but under a PTDO, must maintain a pre-determined level of readiness. At the same time it will have limited ability to achieve desired training (e.g., if that opportunity involves operating away from the home base), or to grant leave or holiday routine.

Substitutes are a third option, used when more than one asset can meet or closely meet the CINC's requirements. However, the unique mission capability of LDHD assets limits the applicability of substitutes.

GMFP uses unique Service and SOCOM guidance to establish OPTEMPO levels for the LDHD assets. Common to all Services and assets however are the following concerns which limit deployment capacity to meet CINC allocation requests: training opportunities, exercise support commitments, maintenance schedules and personnel tempo. GMFP established three levels of OPTEMPO to which the Services/SOCOM manage:⁷ (a) steady-state; (b) surge; and (c) total capacity. Steady-state is used to determine the maximum level of peacetime operations a given LDHD asset can sustain indefinitely. As defined, steady-state does not adversely affect normal training, exercise support, scheduled maintenance cycles and does not violate Service personnel tempo goals. Surge OPTEMPO permits crisis response with minimal detriment to overall readiness. Surge OPTEMPO may have some adverse limitations on training, maintenance, exercise and personnel tempo objectives, but is

limited to 60 days to ensure an adequate recovery period follows. Total capacity OPTEMPO disregards the Service objectives outlined above and is recognized as not being sustainable.

Regular scheduling conferences bring Service LDHD asset representatives together with CINC representatives, under the guidance of the Joint Staff, to schedule steady-state (or higher) OPTEMPO allocation. The CINCs lay out their projected requirements, the Services lay out their projected LDHD asset deployment capacity and the Joint Staff determines the best way to minimize risk and meet GMFP objectives. Cooperation of all participants is essential to the success of these conferences. When executed properly, the CINC representatives will accept some risk to ensure LDHD presence in their area of responsibility at the most critical time. Fortunately, some CINCs face threats that are seasonally influenced (e.g., minimized troop movement during winter) which enables some predictability for their risk.

In addition to scheduling conferences, LDHD asset allocation decisions are made any time a CINC makes a request. GMFP prioritization of LDHD assets applies to those not specified by the Secretary of Defense in the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum during peacetime.⁸ The Joint Staff prepares allocation recommendations when CINC demands exceed steady-state OPTEMPO. The decision, however, on which CINCs get the LDHD allocation is made by the Secretary, based upon "which requirement is most compelling consistent with U.S. national security objectives."⁹ In general, factors such as direct or imminent contact with hostile forces, support of U.S. forces executing operational missions with potential for contact with hostile forces, and support for joint and Service exercises, training and operational tasking other than those involving hostilities, are

addressed in mission prioritization. This process, graphically depicted in the flowchart in Appendix B, is the source of many of the issues that follow.

ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION PROBLEMS

Over the past three years, employment of GMFP has revealed the following problem areas:

- Limited applicability.
- Inadequate use of alternatives.
- Outdated deployment capacity data.
- Lack of formal feedback to readiness tracking systems.
- Subjectivity/inconsistency.

The first administrative problem for GMFP is that some LDHD assets are “fenced” making them ineligible for GMFP deployment. An excellent example of how fencing reduces GMFP effectiveness can be found in the USN/USMC EA-6B aircraft. A precept of GMFP is that the Reserve Components are exempt. The fact that any LDHD assets are in the Reserve Component should in and of itself raise some eyebrows. Another precept of GMFP is that Global Navy Force Presence Policy requirements have precedence over other operations.¹⁰ In other words, LDHD assets scheduled for USN aircraft carrier deployments take priority over GMFP. Additionally, USMC LDHD assets participate in GMFP deployments with the exception that they prioritize marine air ground task force deployments above other GMFP deployments. In the case of the EA-6B aircraft, these “fences” reduce GMFP deployment capacity. As a result of these “fences”, admittedly highlighted in the case

of the EA-6B aircraft, of 19 squadrons in the USN/USNR/USMC, only four squadrons are full participants in GMFP.

Note that by setting aside the carrier air wing aircraft, Global Naval Force Presence Policy establishes a baseline for determining ability to support additional requirements (i.e. surplus for GMFP). The problem is that after the carrier air wings take their bite, and taking into account personnel tempo goals, there is very little "surplus" remaining.

Sources on both ACOM and EUCOM Staffs suggest that the Joint Staff is reluctant to employ the alternative solutions outlined earlier.¹¹ Balancing risk is what GMFP is all about. However, despite built-in tools to help manage the risk, the Joint Staff routinely deploys LDHD assets rather than using the tether, PTDO or substitute options.

Another factor limiting the Joint Staff's ability to administer GMFP is the currency of information related to deployment capacity (for individual LDHD assets) used for determining OPTEMPO levels. The Joint Staff has primary responsibility for annual review of each LDHD asset's deployment capacity.¹² From both CINC and Service perspectives, and by the admission of the Joint Staff itself, this task is not completed according to schedule.¹³ Personnel on the Joint Staff indicate this is an ongoing problem. Inadequate manpower has made it an administrative burden with relatively low priority.

Another shortcoming of GMFP is the lack of formal feedback to readiness/requirements tracking systems. The Joint Staff administers GMFP as an operations oriented tool (vice a planning tool). As a result, there are no hard links to readiness/requirements systems such as Global Status of Resources and Training System or Joint Monthly Readiness Review. Lack of formalized feedback to these systems has delayed recognition of the factors that reduce GMFP effectiveness.

In addition to the shortcomings in GMFP administration, there are also problems with the decision making process. Subjectivity and inconsistency have both been observed by the CINCs and the Services. There have been instances where a CINC's request for LDHD allocation was denied despite meeting the criteria outlined by GMFP. In one recent case the CJCS denied allocation based upon the CINC's understanding of his mission. Mission analysis is the role of the CINC, not GMFP. The problem is allocation approval parameters lack adequate definition, enabling subjectivity to creep into the process. GMFP can only work when used as an impartial tool to determine priority/availability.

There are also indications that the Joint Staff doesn't consistently abide by the guidance laid out in GMFP. ACOM Staff personnel cite this condition as being detrimental to the Service acting as the force planner (i.e. plans how to train, man and equip deployable forces), and the "non-supported" CINCs alike. Subjectivity and inconsistency in the allocation decision process reduce GMFP effectiveness by undermining the critical elements of credibility and cooperation.

Finally, the CINCs also reduce GMFP effectiveness in two ways. First, the warfighting CINCs can limit asset availability to GMFP. ACOM Staff and Joint Staff personnel both cite instances where a CINC who has been "reduced in priority" has not responded to the Joint Staff request to reallocate an LDHD asset. The CINC's defense for keeping the asset is operational risk, and the Joint Staff is reluctant to second-guess the warfighter (besides, possession is nine tenths of the law). Second, designation of an asset as LDHD is intended to protect it from excessive deployment. In the case of one USAF asset which was designated as LDHD prior to initial operation capability, the effect has been the opposite. Because the LDHD asset is on the list, the CINCs request (and receive) allocation

in accordance with GMFP. Because the LDHD asset has a steady-state OPTEMPO of zero, it is in surge upon any deployment.¹⁴ This is not the intent of GMFP.

The GMFP administration and execution problems detailed above primarily direct attention to the Joint Staff. Analysis of the perspectives of the participants and how the GMFP problems affect them will be discussed in the next section.

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF GMFP AND PARTICIPANT PERSPECTIVES

There is ample evidence that the basic goals of GMFP are not being adequately achieved. In 1999 CJCS reported to Congress on the status of GMFP, indicating that "a few assets, such as Patriot, EA-6B and the HC-130, have been tasked at or above preferred GMFP levels for longer than desired".¹⁵ The report then lists 10 of the 32 LDHD assets as having exceeded steady-state OPTEMPO since entry into GMFP (including several repeat offenders and Patriot which has been at or above steady-state continuously since February 1997).¹⁶ Note that the primary measure of effectiveness for GMFP is the maintenance of LDHD assets' OPTEMPO at or below steady-state.

Additionally, General Ralston, Vice CJCS, observed that personnel tempo is going the wrong way when discussing the USAF E-3 advanced warning and control system aircraft. The E-3 has been in surge for some time, with no relief in sight, which is already affecting readiness, training and exercise participation.¹⁷

Additionally, a 1997 Government Accounting Office survey of special operating forces determined their state of readiness indicates similar problems.¹⁸ Responses to the survey from almost 200 senior-level officers and enlisted personnel from special forces units

indicated that they believe their deployments have increased to the point that readiness has been or threatens to be degraded.

Finally, the ACOM Staff tracks LDHD assets within its purview that report reduced readiness. The ACOM Staff cites assets that are consistently in a C-4 readiness status (well below deployable training levels in primary mission areas) as indicative of GMFP administration and execution problems.

Despite the problems, the Joint Staff, CINCs and Services agree that GMFP is a valuable tool that should not be abandoned. However, all have disparate views on what the shortcomings are with GMFP and how to resolve them.

The prevailing "supplier CINC" perspective is that the Joint Staff is so adverse to CINC risk that they are sacrificing the near-term readiness and long-term service life of the LDHD assets. This is viewed as the Joint Staff not taking enough risk. The Joint Staff doesn't make adequate use of alternatives to deployment such as tethers and PTDOs. The effect is to transfer the risk from the CINC to LDHD asset readiness and sustainability. The long-term risks outlined by CJCS that were the genesis for GMFP remain as factors. Taking care of today's peacetime request with an LDHD deployment that incurs surge OPTEMPO increases long-term risk.

In fairness to the Joint Staff, the ACOM Staff recognizes that political pressure leads to erring on the conservative side. Additionally, the ACOM Staff is sensitive to manpower constraints limiting the Joint Staff's administration of GMFP. Considering its impending role as joint force provider, the ACOM Staff could become more involved in the administration of GMFP. It already plays an active role in GMFP with an eye to increasing its influence. According to ACOM Staff personnel, this would reduce the manpower

requirements at the Joint Staff while providing a better product for the warfighting CINCs.¹⁹ To their credit, the ACOM Staff has already negotiated voluntary reductions in requirements by warfighting CINCs. In one case the ACOM Staff successfully employed a “the sky is falling” approach to get relief for a USAF asset, but this tactic becomes less effective with each use.²⁰ Nevertheless, increasing the ACOM Staff’s role in GMFP administration has some merit.

The prevailing “customer CINC” perspective is that no effort is made by the Joint Staff to maintain steady-state OPTEMPO. EUCOM Staff personnel expressed their position on the administration of GMFP by stating that the Joint Staff is “playing a zero sum game with everything in surge and that cannot get better unless they stop some deployments”.²¹ On that point and the “not taking enough risk” perspective, there is agreement between both supplier and customer CINCs. The CINC staffs recognize that they ask for too much and that the Joint Staff will not stop them. However, the warfighting CINCs are the customers in this process and cannot be expected to economize on their own.

Another frustration for the CINCs and Services alike is related to the outdated deployment capacity data. As was outlined earlier, the Joint Staff is charged with updating deployment capacity data for each LDHD asset (e.g. how many assets can deploy under steady-state, surge or total capacity OPTEMPO). The Joint Staff relies upon Service input to keep this data current. Consider the scenario where an LDHD asset’s deployment capacity increased over time (e.g., more aircraft available), however that increase was not reflected under GMFP due to outdated data. The problem is that if the old data are still in use, the LDHD asset will reflect excessive OPTEMPO under GMFP to the detriment of the CINCs. When this has happened in the past, the CINCs second-guessed Joint Staff allocation

decisions, ultimately resulting in reduced cooperation. The converse would be true if the deployment capacity had been reduced over time, except the burden would be on the Service. There are instances of both situations occurring, further muddying the LDHD allocation process.

LDHD allocation inconsistency and subjectivity also frustrate the CINCs. The lack of rigid allocation parameters and adherence to them has made it difficult for the participants. However the frustration is highest for the CINCs who await allocation (e.g. a seasonally oriented allocation schedule). The "waiting" CINC is already accepting some level of risk by not having the LDHD assets in their area of responsibility (per previous agreement). Inevitably, one or more CINC did not get the allocation requested at a scheduling conference. When a subsequent allocation request is granted, the waiting CINCs feel they already "gave at the office" during the scheduling conference. The additional deployment above what was agreed to at the scheduling conference now jeopardizes their ability to get the LDHD asset when they expected which could lead to less cooperation at subsequent scheduling conferences.

The Services share the perception that the Joint Staff is not taking enough risk which makes attaining personnel tempo goals difficult. The Service deploying their LDHD asset at excessive OPTEMPO levels has to deal with the quality of life complaints, accelerated wear on the LDHD assets, lost training opportunities and reduced morale which have long-term readiness implications. However, the Services understand that with GMFP their LDHD assets have an added layer of oversight which takes their individual personnel tempo guidance into account. Properly administered, GMFP serves as a protective mechanism against the "unquenchable appetites" of the CINCs.

The issues outlined above are not a complete mystery to the Joint Staff. Applicability limitations discussed earlier have been most troublesome. The Joint Staff readily acknowledges that Global Naval Force Presence Policy has been a problem for GMFP, especially effecting the USN/USMC relationship over the EA-6B aircraft. The limited applicability factors discussed earlier have directly contributed to the excessive OPTEMPO that the EA-6B community has endured while supporting GMFP deployments. Additionally, the Government Accounting Office has questioned the Joint Staff about the role of LDHD assets in Reserve Components.²²

The Joint Staff believes that GMFP is an operations oriented process with the best of intentions. GMFP is also an evolutionary process that they are vigorously working to improve.²³ While it acknowledges shortcomings with the process, ultimately the Joint Staff works the middle-man role using GMFP as the balance between CINC demands and Service personnel tempo goals. The Joint Staff recognizes and respects the position of the CINC, as a combatant commander, that leads to the Service perception of an “unquenchable appetite”.

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

GMFP is good but flawed. Specific conclusions drawn from previous discussion, and in-depth conversations with those closest to the workings of GMFP from representative Joint Staffs and Services will be presented, along with recommendations to affect process improvements.

The Joint Staff must reduce surge level OPTEMPO for LDHD assets. The CINCs and Services both recognize that the Joint Staff accepts too little risk. This translates to increased OPTEMPO for the LDHD assets which reduces scheduling flexibility since the

assets require recovery time. Additionally, the increased hours and reduced maintenance opportunities will wear the LDHD assets out before their projected service life, not to mention the effect it has on morale and retention. If LDHD assets like the EA-6B are retired from service before a replacement is programmed, then the CINCs will face greater risk. GMFP should give top priority to OPTEMPO in all peacetime decisions. The Joint Staff would better serve all participants by demonstrating deployment discipline. This includes increased use of alternatives, decreased acceptance of surge and wartime OPTEMPO and stricter adherence to GMFP allocation guidance. By accepting some near-term risk, the result will be greater scheduling flexibility and reduced long-term risk. The LDHD assets will have increased availability, at higher levels of readiness, when they are required for crisis response.

Applicability limitations decrease the effectiveness of GMFP. The first item that should be reviewed is the role of Reserve Component assets. This should be reviewed by either the Joint Staff or the ACOM Staff to evaluate how fenced Reserve Component assets are affecting the active LDHD forces. A similar analysis should be completed on other “fences” such as Global Naval Force Presence Policy. If LDHD assets are to remain fenced, the increase in active force OPTEMPO and decrease in material readiness should be quantified. Removal of applicability limitations should be a top priority to extract the most from GMFP.

GMFP must increase visibility for LDHD asset readiness. GMFP lacks hard links to “keep well” or “get well” mechanisms to track readiness trends in a timely manner.²⁴ Lacking feedback to Global Status Of Resources and Training System, Joint Monthly Readiness Review and other readiness/requirements systems hinders this objective. The

Joint Staff's recently initiated review of GMFP and LDHD assets, at the request of the CINCs, is an indicator of the validity of this conclusion. To achieve tighter control of readiness for LDHD assets, prioritize their inclusion in the most current readiness tracking systems.

GMFP suffers from outdated deployment capacity data and inadequate information flow. The Joint Staff is already looking to implement additional administrative aspects of GMFP. Goals of this effort are to improve: (a) standardization of LDHD asset tracking mechanics and; (b) allocation decision support.²⁵ The Joint Staff intends to employ modern information technology capabilities in support of these measures. Distribution of standard spreadsheets will enable tracking of LDHD asset status. Use of secure internet home pages will affect timely and wide dissemination of data. This will provide the CINCs with insight into what LDHD assets are deployed and the status of those not deployed. These measures will help with the former goal. Additionally, the Joint Staff should standardize and provide updating milestones for deployment capacity data that can be readily accessed by Services and CINCs to help with the latter goal. By asking the Services and CINCs to track and update relevant OPTEMPO data for their LDHD assets, and to make that data readily accessible to other CINCs, all participants will be more likely to support GMFP intent and guidance. Fully supporting these efforts should be a top priority for the Joint Staff, CINC and Service staffs alike.

Subjectivity and inconsistency in the prioritization/allocation processes are detrimental to the success of GMFP. These two items are harder to quantify because they affect the level of cooperation provided by GMFP participants. Personal agendas and bad feelings resulting from earlier allocation decisions are the surest way to derail GMFP

(especially at the scheduling conferences). GMFP must provide precise allocation requirement parameters. Make it easy for the CINC to know when to ask for an LDHD asset, and when not to ask. At the same time, the Joint Staff must have adequate allocation guidance and political support to make allocation decisions without being second-guessed. If the operational mission is well stated, then it should be up to the CINC to determine requirements to achieve it. The Joint Staff should only assess availability/priority (not review the mission). Recommend allocation when parameters are met and recommend no allocation (or use of alternatives) when they are not. If the Joint Staff consistently responds according to their well defined parameters, everyone will benefit. The importance of cooperation cannot be overstated, so removal of impediments to it should be a top priority. Refine the allocation request and approval parameters for the GMFP goals and process.

As written, GMFP has the potential to improve LDHD asset readiness and minimize CINC risk in both the near and long term. The good news is that throwing money at this problem is not the answer. Expanded applicability, more disciplined allocation and improved data flow are the keys to optimizing the use of LDHD assets. Additionally, the Joint Staff should retain responsibility for administration of GMFP. Despite some growing pains and the need to focus on the true objectives, the Joint Staff still represents the best organization for administration of GMFP.

NOTES

¹ General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Posture Statement before the 105th Congressional Committee on National Security, United States House of Representatives, Washington D.C. 5 February 1998, 9.

² Ibid, 9.

³ The Joint Staff, Global Military Force Policy, Washington D.C., message (231301Z JUL 96).

⁴ For brevity, Services will be written as USAF, USN, and USMC for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps respectively. U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of geographic commands will be abbreviated similarly to SOCOM. EUCOM for European Command, CENTCOM for Central Command, PACOM for Pacific Command and ACOM for Atlantic Command. Collectively they will be referred to as CINCs.

⁵ The Joint Staff, Report to Congress on the Global Military Force Policy, Washington D.C., 1999, 8.

⁶ The Joint Staff, Global Military Force Policy, Washington D.C., message (231301Z JUL 96).

⁷ The Joint Staff, Report to Congress on the Global Military Force Policy, Washington D.C., 1999, 8.

⁸ Ibid, 9. All Service forces (except as noted in U.S. Code) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President.

⁹ Ibid, 10.

¹⁰ The Joint Staff, Global Military Force Policy, Washington D.C., message (231301Z JUL 96).

¹¹ MAJ Steven Hertig, Atlantic Command J338 and CDR Tim Conroy, European Command J3, interviews by author, 1-21 April 1999.

¹² The Joint Staff, Report to Congress on the Global Military Force Policy, Washington D.C., 1999, 10.

¹³ LTC Gaylen Tovrea, The Joint Staff J3 EUCOM JOD, interviews by author, 20 March – 19 April 1999, <gaylen.tovrea"@"js.pentagon.mil>.

¹⁴ MAJ Steven Hertig, Atlantic Command J338, interviews by author, 1-21 April 1999, <j338b"@"hq.acom.mil>.

¹⁵ The Joint Staff, Report to Congress on the Global Military Force Policy, Washington D.C., 1999, 5.

¹⁶ Ibid, 12.

¹⁷ MAJ Steven Hertig, Atlantic Command J338, interviews by author, 1-21 April 1999, <j338b"@"hq.acom.mil>.

¹⁸ Government Accounting Office, Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse, Letter Report, 15 May 1997.

¹⁹ MAJ Steven Hertig, Atlantic Command J338, interviews by author, 1-21 April 1999, <j338b"@"hq.acom.mil>.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ CDR Tim Conroy, European Command J3, interviews by author, 1-24 April 1999, <conroyt"@"hq.eucom.smil.mil>.

²² LTC Gaylen Tovrea, The Joint Staff J3 EUCOM JOD, interviews by author, 20 March – 19 April 1999, <gaylen.tovrea"@"js.pentagon.mil>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ LTC Gaylen Tovrea, "Administrative Supplement to Global Military Force Policy." Draft message, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C. 1999.

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
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Table I
GMFP Designated Low Density High Demand Assets

Mission Area	Unit or Platform	Service
Recce/Battle Management	E-3 AWACS	USAF
	EC-130	USAF
	U-2	USAF
	RC-135	USAF
	Storm Jib	USN
	Ground Tactical Air Control System	USAF
	Joint STARS	USAF
	Predator UAV	USAF
Electronic Combat Aircraft	EA-6B	USN/USMC
	EC-130H	USAF
Special Ops Forces	Special Forces	SOCOM
	75th Ranger Regiment	SOCOM
	PSYOPS	SOCOM
	Civil Affairs	SOCOM
	112th Special Ops Signal Battalion	SOCOM
	160th Special Ops Aviation Regiment	SOCOM
	Special Tactics Teams	SOCOM
	MH-53J	SOCOM
	MH-60G	SOCOM
	MC-130P	SOCOM
	AC-130H	SOCOM
	AC-130U	SOCOM
	SEAL Platoons	SOCOM
	Patrol Coastal	SOCOM
	Rigid Inflatable Boat	SOCOM
	Mark V Craft	SOCOM
Air Defense	PATRIOT	USA
Attack Aircraft	A/OA-10	USAF
Rescue Aircraft	HC-130 N/P	USAF
	HH-60G	USAF
Chem/Bio Defense	310th Chemical Company	USA
	Technical Escort Unit	USA

Appendix A

Table II
GMFP Decision Process Flowchart



Appendix B